Table 1 shows the disclosure dates of news events caused by workplace accidents or occupational diseases leading to employee casualties for Taiwanese listed companies, categorized by TSE industry, and year from January 2005 to October 2023. The TSE industries are based on the Taiwan Stock Exchange industry category guidelines. The analysis identified 127 incidents across various industries. The building materials and construction industries, along with shipping, had the highest number of accidents, with 15 and 16 cases, respectively. The plastics, steel, and semiconductor industries also reported notable numbers of incidents. Some industries, such as food, textiles, electrical machinery, rubber, automotive, communication networks, and electronic distribution, reported only a single accident, highlighting potential but less frequent risks. Additionally, the "other industries" category had two reported accidents, showing the need for broad safety measures. These findings underlined the critical need for robust safety protocols and targeted risk management strategies to protect employees and improve workplace safety across all sectors. The building materials and construction sector consistently shows high rates of workplace accidents and fatalities. Construction work's inherent dangers, including heavy machinery, hazardous materials, and precarious conditions, contribute to this risk (Shafique & Rafiq, 2019; Hsieh et al., 2020; Liao & Chiang, 2022). Similarly, international shipping is another high-risk industry, with the unpredictability of maritime work and the handling of heavy cargo leading to high rates of fatalities, injuries, and mental health issues among seafarers (Hetherington et al., 2006; Devereus et al., 2020). Therefore, this study indicates that accidents occur most frequently in the building materials and construction industry as well as the shipping industry. This finding aligns with the literature, which consistently identifies the construction and international shipping industries as having the highest accident rates and being among the most dangerous sectors.
Table 1
The distribution of news events disclosed from January 2005 to October 2023 regarding workplace accidents or occupational diseases among employees of Taiwanese listed companies, categorized by industry and year.
| Industry | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2009 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Total |
| Cement | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 |
| Plastic | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 10 |
| Papermaking | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Steel | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 10 |
| Build | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 15 |
| Shipping | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 16 |
| Other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 |
| Chemical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| Biological Technology | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 |
| Oil, Electricity and Gas | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Semiconductor | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 11 |
| Computer Peripherals | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Photoelectric | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 |
| Electronic Components | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 9 |
| Other Electronics | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 8 |
| Green Energy | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Sports and Leisure | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Total | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 10 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 10 | 12 | 16 | 12 | 19 | 127 |
The Table 2 shows Descriptive Statistics, including AR, CAR, TA, PB, Debt Ratio, Current, Turnover, ROA, Cash flow and R&D. The average values for AR0 and AR1 are − 0.8264% and − 0.4979%, respectively, indicating a slight negative trend in the data. The average values for CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-1, 2), and CAR (-1, 3) are all negative, ranging from − 1.4988%, -1.9482%, and − 2.1732%, suggesting a more pronounced negative trend in cumulative returns. Examining the minimum values provides further insights into the potential downside risk. The minimum values for AR0 and AR1 are − 10.9481%, and − 11.0050%, respectively, highlighting the possibility of significant negative returns. Similarly, the minimum values for CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-1, 2), and CAR (-1, 3) are − 20.7478%, -31.4068% and − 41.4530%, indicating a greater potential for substantial losses in cumulative returns. Conversely, the maximum values for AR0 and AR1 are 9.1448% and 7.3406%, CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-1, 2), and CAR (-1, 3) are 15.7888%, 14.8671%, and 16.3550%, respectively, suggesting a limited upside potential. Finally, the median values provide a measure of central tendency. The median values for AR0 and AR1 are − 0.5786% and 0.0308%, respectively, indicating that half of the data points fall below these values. The median values for CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-1, 2), and CAR (-1, 3) are − 0.7661%, -0.9177%, and − 0.8522%, suggesting a general tendency towards negative cumulative returns.
Table 2
| variable | Mean | Median | Maximum | Minimum | Std. Dev. | Observations |
| AR0 | -0.8264 | -0.5786 | 9.1448 | -10.9481 | 2.9560 | 127 |
| AR1 | -0.4979 | -0.0308 | 7.3406 | -11.0050 | 2.7208 | 127 |
| CAR(-1, 1) | -1.4988 | -0.7661 | 15.7888 | -20.7478 | 5.2235 | 127 |
| CAR(-1, 2) | -1.9482 | -0.9177 | 14.8671 | -31.4068 | 6.3864 | 127 |
| CAR(-1, 3) | -2.1732 | -0.8522 | 16.3550 | -41.4530 | 7.1343 | 127 |
| TA(Million) | 232550.1 | 25866 | 3378495 | 432 | 580630.1 | 127 |
| PB | 1.9267 | 1.4900 | 9.0400 | 0.3600 | 1.5588 | 127 |
| Debt | 46.4584 | 49.2000 | 81.5900 | 12.0700 | 16.5581 | 127 |
| Current | 198.6249 | 172.0900 | 907.4900 | 62.9000 | 113.2206 | 127 |
| TA Turnover | 0.7480 | 0.6100 | 2.1100 | 0.0500 | 0.4474 | 127 |
| ROA | 7.6384 | 6.3900 | 37.4000 | -25.4900 | 8.8167 | 127 |
| Cash Flow | 0.3655 | 0.2754 | 1.6854 | -1.4628 | 0.5214 | 127 |
| R&D(Million) | 106741.4 | 757.2 | 5335196 | 0 | 517383 | 127 |
In finance, information flow significantly impacts market movements, particularly stock prices. This passage examines how negative news events influence stock prices and investor reactions. A graph (Fig. 1) illustrates this impact, with the horizontal axis representing the period from one day before to five days after the news, and the vertical axis showing the percentage change in stock price. The blue line depicts the average abnormal return rate, while the red line represents the average cumulative abnormal return. On the announcement day, both rates drop significantly, reflecting investors' immediate negative reaction. In the following days, the abnormal return rate shows signs of recovery as investors reassess the news, while the cumulative abnormal return continues to decline, indicating sustained negative effects. This pattern highlights the lasting impact of negative news on stock prices despite initial overreactions. Understanding these market dynamics is essential for investors to make informed decisions and navigate the financial landscape effectively.
In the realm of finance, the impact of negative news on stock market behavior is a subject of considerable significance and extensive study. The rapid dissemination of information via the Internet often precipitates emotional responses, leading to impulsive decisions by investors. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) demonstrated that investors tend to overreact to negative news, resulting in an initial decline in stock prices, which is followed by a gradual recovery. Similarly, research by Boubaker et al. (2015) identified a pattern of negative abnormal returns in the wake of terrorist attacks, with a subsequent rebound on the fourth day. Empirical data, illustrated in Fig. 1, corroborates these findings by depicting a pronounced decline in both average abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns on the day of the news release, followed by a complete recovery by the fourth day. This pattern underscores the phenomenon of initial overreaction succeeded by a phase of rational adjustment. The propensity for overreaction can be attributed to several factors, including cognitive biases, emotional influences, and herd behavior. Cognitive biases, such as the availability heuristic, lead investors to overestimate the significance of recent negative events. Emotional influences, such as fear and anxiety, further drive irrational decision-making. Additionally, herd behavior amplifies the impact of negative news, as investors tend to mimic the actions of their peers. Understanding these behavioral tendencies is essential for investors aiming to make well-informed decisions and avoid emotional biases.
Table 3 presents the AR from the event day to three days post-event, which are significantly negative, indicating that the market reacts negatively to workplace safety incidents, with a short-term significant impact. Firm size is significantly positive for AR0 = 0.3282 (p < 5%), CAR (-1, 1) = 0.5980 (p < 5%), CAR (-1, 2) = 0.7385 (p < 5%), and CAR (-1, 3) = 0.9102 (p < 1%), suggesting that larger firms experience a more moderate market reaction, with a smaller impact on their stock prices in the three days following the incident. The price-to-book (PB) ratio is significantly negative at CAR (-1, 3) = -0.8571 (p < 10%), implying that firms with higher investor expectations experience a more pronounced negative market reaction to workplace safety incidents. Return on assets (ROA) is significantly negative at AR0 = -0.0976 (p < 5%), suggesting that highly profitable firms are more susceptible to immediate negative market reactions on the event day. The results of this study are consistent with the findings reported by Kabir, Q. S., Watson, K., & Somaratna, T. (2018).
Table 3
Event study methodology on workplace accidents or occupational diseases.
| Variable | AR 0 | AR 1 | CAR(-1, 1) | CAR(-1, 2) | CAR(-1, 3) |
| C | -4.3259 | -4.7190 | -8.6405 | -7.5656 | -11.3560 |
| | (-2.0551**) | (-2.3762**) | (-2.3300**) | (-1.6622*) | (-2.2352**) |
| LOG_TA(Million) | 0.3282 | 0.1956 | 0.5980 | 0.7385 | 0.9102 |
| | (2.2867**) | (1.4445) | (2.3653**) | (2.3797**) | (2.6276***) |
| PB | 0.0510 | -0.1303 | -0.4202 | -0.6199 | -0.8571 |
| | (0.2549) | (-0.6904) | (-1.1924) | (-1.4331) | (-1.7751*) |
| Debt | 0.0059 | 0.0177 | 0.0122 | -0.0005 | 0.0225 |
| | (0.2834) | (0.8975) | (0.3313) | (-0.0107) | (0.4460) |
| Current | 0.0031 | 0.0043 | 0.0045 | 0.0055 | 0.0049 |
| | (1.1224) | (1.6553) | (0.9129) | (0.9189) | (0.7250) |
| TA Turnover | 0.5898 | 0.5129 | 0.9562 | 0.6208 | 0.8614 |
| | (0.9348) | (0.8616) | (0.8602) | (0.4550) | (0.5656) |
| ROA | -0.0976 | -0.0203 | -0.1255 | -0.1388 | -0.0995 |
| | (-2.4329**) | (-0.5367) | (-1.7752) | (-1.5993) | (-1.0270) |
| Cash Flow | -0.2470 | -0.2904 | -0.0345 | -0.3539 | -0.2199 |
| | (-0.3858) | (-0.4808) | (-0.0306) | (-0.2557) | (-0.1424) |
| R&D(Million) | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| | (-0.5758) | (0.2211) | (-0.1934) | (-0.1982) | (-0.5614) |
| Fixed year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 | 0.1152 | 0.0704 | 0.1206 | 0.1137 | 0.1151 |
| F-statistic | 1.6918* | 0.9840 | 1.7821* | 1.6676 | 1.6905* |
| *, **, and *** significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. |
Workplace accidents have significant impacts on companies, affecting not only stock prices but also corporate reputation, credibility, and causing considerable harm to investors and stakeholders. Since the implementation of ESG in 2015, it is worth examining whether there is a difference in AR associated with workplace accidents between companies that adopted ESG practices and those that did not. A t-test was conducted to compare the abnormal returns of non-ESG and ESG-adopting companies when workplace accidents occurred.
As shown in Table 4, on the event day (AR0), the abnormal return for non-ESG companies was − 0.8921, while that for ESG-adopting companies was − 0.7904. The t-statistic was − 0.1848 (p-value > 10%), indicating no statistical significance. On the following day (AR1), the abnormal return for non-ESG companies was − 0.6871, compared to -0.3941 for ESG-adopting companies, with a t-statistic of -0.5790 (p-value > 10%), also not significant. For the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window (-1, + 1), CAR (-1, 1) was − 2.0489 for non-ESG companies and − 1.1969 for ESG-adopting companies, with a t-statistic of -0.8784 (p-value > 10%), showing no statistical significance.
Although the results are not statistically significant, it is evident that ESG-adopting companies experienced less negative abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns compared to non-ESG companies. This suggests that companies with ESG practices place greater emphasis on workplace safety and accident prevention.
Table 4
Comparison of company abnormal returns before and after ESG implementation on workplace accidents
| Characteristics | Observations | AR0 | AR 1 | CAR(-1, 1) | CAR(-1, 2) | CAR(-1, 3) |
| No ESG firms | 45 | -0.8921 | -0.6871 | -2.0489 | -1.9243 | -2.2173 |
| ESG firms | 82 | -0.7904 | -0.3941 | -1.1969 | -1.9613 | -2.1490 |
| t-Statistic | | (-0.1848) | (-0.5790) | (-0.8784) | (0.0311) | (-0.0514) |
| *, **, and *** significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. |
Table 5 examines the impact of workplace safety incidents on environmental scores by incorporating ESG-related control variables in the regression model. The coefficients for firms with A and C environmental ratings are negative but not statistically significant, while the coefficient for firms with a B rating is positive but also not significant. These results suggest that workplace safety incidents do not significantly affect environmental scores across different environmental rating levels.
Table 5
The impact of workplace accidents or occupational diseases on Environmental scores.
| variable | AR 0 | AR 1 | CAR(-1, 1) | CAR(-1, 2) | CAR(-1, 3) |
| C | -4.0549 | -4.0906 | -6.5774 | -5.6196 | -9.5594 |
| | (-1.7963*) | (-1.8308*) | (-1.6143) | (-1.1230) | (-1.7028*) |
| LOG_TA(Million) | 0.2480 | 0.1252 | 0.4173 | 0.5599 | 0.7085 |
| | (1.5716) | (0.8018) | (1.4651) | (1.6007) | (1.8054*) |
| PB | -0.0944 | -0.1726 | -0.6408 | -0.8922 | -1.0587 |
| | (-0.4440) | (-0.8205) | (-1.6701*) | (-1.8932*) | (-2.0024**) |
| Debt | 0.0139 | 0.0203 | 0.0243 | 0.0113 | 0.0346 |
| | (0.6778) | (0.9992) | (0.6564) | (0.2485) | (0.6773) |
| Current | 0.0025 | 0.0033 | 0.0027 | 0.0028 | 0.0014 |
| | (0.8695) | (1.1692) | (0.5315) | (0.4431) | (0.1931) |
| TA Turnover | 0.5863 | 0.4700 | 0.7548 | 0.5266 | 0.6938 |
| | (0.9321) | (0.7548) | (0.6648) | (0.3776) | (0.4434) |
| ROA | -0.0655 | -0.0164 | -0.0918 | -0.0958 | -0.0687 |
| | (-1.5628) | (-0.3953) | (-1.2133) | (-1.0314) | (-0.6590) |
| Cash Flow | -0.1703 | -0.3563 | -0.0215 | -0.4509 | -0.4368 |
| | (-0.2460) | (-0.5202) | (-0.0172) | (-0.2939) | (-0.2538) |
| R&D(Million) | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| | (-0.5763) | (0.2137) | (-0.2368) | (-0.2793) | (-0.5936) |
| E score_Dummy A | -0.0308 | -0.0178 | -0.0569 | -0.1028 | -0.0969 |
| | (-0.9464) | (-0.5529) | (-0.9698) | (-1.4247) | (-1.1974) |
| E score_Dummy B | 0.0071 | -0.0150 | 0.0155 | 0.0141 | 0.0002 |
| | (0.2546) | (-0.5468) | (0.3099) | (0.2283) | (0.0035) |
| E score_Dummy C | -0.0018 | -0.0144 | -0.0317 | -0.0120 | -0.0462 |
| | (-0.0564) | (-0.4464) | (-0.5396) | (-0.1658) | (-0.5700) |
| S score | 0.0427 | 0.0253 | 0.0852 | 0.0921 | 0.1240 |
| | (1.2787) | (0.7653) | (1.4135) | (-1.2440) | (1.4931) |
| G score | 0.0225 | 0.0412 | 0.0799 | 0.1095 | 0.1251 |
| | (0.6474) | (1.1960) | (1.2733) | (1.4210) | (1.4467) |
| Health score | -0.0054 | -0.0015 | -0.0135 | -0.0191 | -0.0334 |
| | (-0.3303) | (-0.0943) | (-0.4574) | (-0.5262) | (-0.8184) |
| Fair score | -0.0429 | -0.0256 | -0.0809 | -0.0913 | -0.0930 |
| | (-1.8010*) | (-1.0859) | (-1.8824*) | (-1.7289*) | (-1.5695) |
| Fixed year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 | 0.1482 | 0.1006 | 0.1749 | 0.1635 | 0.1719 |
| F-statistic | 1.185 | 0.7617 | 1.444 | 1.3315 | 1.4146 |
| *, **, and *** significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. |
Table 6 explores the impact of workplace safety incidents on social scores. For firms with a B rating, social scores are significantly positive at CAR (-1, 1) = 0.0880 (p < 10%) and CAR (-1, 3) = 0.1056 (p < 10%), indicating that these firms demonstrate greater resilience in maintaining their social standing despite workplace safety incidents. The coefficient for firms with an A rating is positive but not significant, suggesting that these firms can effectively manage such events. In contrast, the coefficient for firms with a C rating is negative but not significant, indicating that the market perceives their CSR efforts more negatively when workplace safety incidents occur.
Table 6
The impact of workplace accidents or occupational diseases on Social scores.
| variable | AR 0 | AR 1 | CAR(-1, 1) | CAR(-1, 2) | CAR(-1, 3) |
| C | -4.7501 | -4.5999 | -8.1076 | -7.1003 | -11.7300 |
| | (-2.1087**) | (-2.0798**) | (-2.0013**) | (-1.4087( | (-2.0814**) |
| LOG_TA(Million) | 0.2839 | 0.1668 | 0.5151 | 0.6815 | 0.8824 |
| | (1.8819*) | (1.1257) | (1.8985*) | (2.0188**) | (2.3377**) |
| PB | -0.1219 | -0.1848 | -0.6932 | -0.9622 | -1.1800 |
| | (-0.5815) | (-0.8980) | (-1.8394*) | (-2.0520**) | (-2.2506**) |
| Debt | 0.0169 | 0.0209 | 0.0293 | 0.0127 | 0.0400 |
| | (0.8101) | (1.0215) | (0.7812) | (0.2723) | (0.7672) |
| Current | 0.0020 | 0.0025 | 0.0014 | 0.0022 | 0.0005 |
| | (0.6935) | (0.9032) | (0.2804) | (0.3489) | (0.0719) |
| TA Turnover | 0.6191 | 0.4070 | 0.8034 | 0.4996 | 0.7464 |
| | (0.9875) | (0.6613) | (0.7126) | (0.3562) | (0.4759) |
| ROA | -0.0605 | -0.0104 | -0.0781 | -0.0788 | -0.0505 |
| | (-1.4467) | (-0.2530) | (-1.0379) | (-0.8417) | (-0.4821) |
| Cash Flow | 0.0536 | -0.1769 | 0.4356 | 0.1105 | 0.3657 |
| | (0.0789) | (-0.2654) | (0.3568) | (0.0728) | (0.2153) |
| R&D(Million) | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| | (-0.6237) | (0.1978) | (-0.3003) | (-0.3329) | (-0.6977) |
| E score | -0.0143 | -0.0372 | -0.0466 | -0.0279 | -0.0672 |
| | (-0.4738) | (-1.2553) | (-0.8592) | (-0.4127) | (-0.8897) |
| S score_Dummy A | 0.0035 | 0.0354 | 0.0325 | 0.0182 | 0.0121 |
| | (0.1087) | (1.1245) | (0.5638) | (0.2529) | (0.1506) |
| S score_Dummy B | 0.0412 | 0.0290 | 0.0880 | 0.0665 | 0.1056 |
| | (1.6279) | (1.1674) | (1.9312*) | (1.1730) | (1.6662*) |
| S score_Dummy C | -0.0118 | -0.0370 | -0.0477 | -0.0513 | -0.0494 |
| | (-0.3947) | (-1.2579) | (-0.8854) | (-0.7660) | (-0.6597) |
| G score | 0.0131 | 0.0329 | 0.0532 | 0.0921 | 0.0922 |
| | (0.3665) | (0.9383) | (0.8282) | (1.1538) | (1.0325) |
| Health score | 0.0017 | -0.0037 | -0.0025 | -0.0061 | -0.0129 |
| | (0.1014) | (-0.2237) | (-0.0813) | (-0.1619) | (-0.3055) |
| Fair score | -0.0439 | -0.0265 | -0.0806 | -0.0933 | -0.0978 |
| | (-1.8684*) | (-1.1520) | (-1.9090*) | (-1.7758*) | (-1.6663*) |
| Fixed year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 | 0.1514 | 0.1183 | 0.1840 | 0.1510 | 0.1652 |
| F-statistic | 1.2156 | 0.9141 | 1.5361 | 1.2119 | 1.3481 |
| *, **, and *** significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. |
Table 7 examines the impact of workplace safety incidents on corporate governance scores. The coefficients for firms with A, B, and C governance ratings are all insignificant, suggesting that corporate governance scores do not experience significant changes following workplace safety incidents. This may indicate that corporate governance scores are influenced by other ESG-related control variables rather than workplace safety incidents alone.
Table 7
The impact of workplace accidents or occupational diseases on Governance scores.
| variable | AR 0 | AR 1 | CAR(-1, 1) | CAR(-1, 2) | CAR(-1, 3) |
| C | -4.2166 | -4.2417 | -7.3839 | -6.8205 | -11.1720 |
| | (-1.8547*) | (-1.8793*) | (-1.7808*) | (-1.3330) | (-1.9475*) |
| LOG_TA(Million) | 0.2522 | 0.1470 | 0.4804 | 0.6521 | 0.8454 |
| | (1.6307) | (0.9576) | (1.7033*) | (1.8737*) | (2.1664**) |
| PB | 0.0159 | -0.0706 | -0.4879 | -0.6735 | -0.8568 |
| | (0.0720) | (-0.3216) | (-1.2096) | (-1.3532) | (-1.5354) |
| Debt | 0.0131 | 0.0192 | 0.0245 | 0.0114 | 0.0355 |
| | (0.6347) | (0.9347) | (0.6480) | (0.2449) | (0.6793) |
| Current | 0.0031 | 0.0038 | 0.0047 | 0.0060 | 0.0052 |
| | (1.0757) | (1.3091) | (0.8821) | (0.9158) | (0.7113) |
| TA Turnover | 0.5315 | 0.3427 | 0.7184 | 0.4221 | 0.6536 |
| | (0.8357) | (0.5428) | (0.6194) | (0.2949) | (0.4073) |
| ROA | -0.0765 | -0.0255 | -0.1060 | -0.1201 | -0.0959 |
| | (-1.7667*) | (-0.5929) | (-1.3424) | (-1.2329) | (-0.8785) |
| Cash Flow | -0.1574 | -0.2562 | 0.0630 | -0.2452 | -0.1660 |
| | (-0.2308) | (-0.3785) | (0.0507) | (-0.1598) | (-0.0965) |
| R&D(Million) | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| | (-0.4326) | (0.3278) | (-0.1451) | (-0.1682) | (-0.5190) |
| E score | 0.0035 | -0.0159 | -0.0104 | 0.0065 | -0.0232 |
| | (0.1174) | (-0.5423) | (-0.1927) | (0.0975) | (-0.3099) |
| S score | 0.0479 | 0.0387 | 0.0961 | 0.0925 | 0.1217 |
| | (1.3884) | (1.1287) | (1.5271) | (1.1909) | (1.3973) |
| G score_Dummy A | 0.0009 | 0.0222 | -0.0019 | -0.0175 | -0.0319 |
| | (0.0279) | (0.6966) | (-0.0320) | (-0.2426) | (-0.3941) |
| G score_Dummy B | 0.0073 | -0.0054 | 0.0104 | 0.0281 | 0.0379 |
| | (0.2135) | (-0.1606) | (0.1671) | (0.3674) | (0.4421) |
| G score_Dummy C | -0.0355 | -0.0295 | -0.0313 | -0.0463 | -0.0441 |
| | (-0.9348) | (-0.7808) | (-0.4516) | (-0.5416) | (-0.4602) |
| Health score | -0.0074 | -0.0051 | -0.0152 | -0.0239 | -0.0363 |
| | (-0.4486) | (-0.3074) | (-0.5023) | (-0.6426) | (-0.8701) |
| Fair score | -0.0218 | -0.0088 | -0.0415 | -0.0345 | -0.0306 |
| | (-0.8737) | (-0.3556) | (-0.9113) | (-0.6138) | (-0.4849) |
| Fixed year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 | 0.1450 | 0.0917 | 0.1545 | 0.1346 | 0.1444 |
| F-statistic | 1.1552 | 0.6878 | 1.2447 | 1.0598 | 1.1500 |
| *, **, and *** significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. |
Table 8 investigates the impact of workplace safety incidents on employee health and safety scores. The coefficient for B-rated firms at CAR (-1, 1) = 0.0436 (p < 10%) is significantly positive, implying that these firms experience minimal negative effects on their employee health and safety ratings. This could be attributed to strong pre-existing safety measures and crisis management capabilities. Conversely, the coefficient for C-rated firms is negative but not significant, suggesting that firms with lower ratings in this category require enhanced regulatory oversight and supervision to ensure continuous improvement in employee health and safety conditions.
Table 8
The impact of workplace accidents or occupational diseases on Health scores.
| variable | AR 0 | AR 1 | CAR(-1, 1) | CAR(-1, 2) | CAR(-1, 3) |
| C | -4.1647 | -4.2161 | -7.0549 | -6.1911 | -10.1758 |
| | (-1.8786*) | (-1.9279*) | (-1.7675*) | (-1.2415) | (-1.8302*) |
| LOG_TA(Million) | 0.2335 | 0.1260 | 0.4119 | 0.5899 | 0.7362 |
| | (1.6143) | (0.8828) | (1.5813) | (1.8129*) | (2.0293**) |
| PB | -0.0891 | -0.1883 | -0.6572 | -0.9206 | -1.1090 |
| | (-0.4297) | (-0.9207) | (-1.7603*) | (-1.9737*) | (-2.1324**) |
| Debt | 0.0161 | 0.0222 | 0.0303 | 0.0157 | 0.0403 |
| | (0.7797) | (1.0899) | (0.8170) | (0.3385) | (0.7787) |
| Current | 0.0012 | 0.0020 | 0.0005 | 0.0011 | -0.0011 |
| | (0.4137) | (0.7068) | (0.1000) | (0.1716) | (-0.1462) |
| TA Turnover | 0.6353 | 0.4794 | 0.8991 | 0.6125 | 0.8621 |
| | (1.0313) | (0.7889) | (0.8107) | (0.4421) | (0.5581) |
| ROA | -0.0648 | -0.0162 | -0.0883 | -0.0873 | -0.0634 |
| | (-1.5935) | (-0.4028) | (-1.2065) | (-0.9541) | (-0.6214) |
| Cash Flow | -0.0460 | -0.1767 | 0.3132 | -0.0248 | 0.1597 |
| | (-0.0682) | (-0.2654) | (0.2577) | (-0.0163) | (0.0943) |
| R&D(Million) | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| | (-0.5781) | (0.2092) | (-0.2672) | (-0.3241) | (-0.6644) |
| E score | -0.0278 | -0.0497 | -0.0727 | -0.0610 | -0.1052 |
| | (-0.9277) | (-1.6797*) | (-1.3453) | (-0.9044) | (-1.3979) |
| S score | 0.0421 | 0.0205 | 0.0768 | 0.0734 | 0.1004 |
| | (1.3578) | (0.6698) | (1.3762) | (1.0533) | (1.2911) |
| G score | 0.0160 | 0.0363 | 0.0583 | 0.0855 | 0.0933 |
| | (0.4617) | (1.0598) | (0.9313) | (1.0939) | (1.0701) |
| Health score_Dummy A | 0.0030 | 0.0126 | 0.0050 | -0.0105 | -0.0128 |
| | (0.1984) | (0.8502) | (0.1837) | (-0.3101) | (-0.3383) |
| Health score_Dummy B | 0.0197 | 0.0194 | 0.0436 | 0.0367 | 0.0493 |
| | (1.6031) | (1.6054) | (1.9721*) | (1.3281) | (1.6021) |
| Health score_Dummy C | -0.0228 | -0.0244 | -0.0406 | -0.0372 | -0.0517 |
| | (-1.4683) | (-1.5871) | (-1.4485) | (-1.0619) | (-1.3251) |
| Fair score | -0.0387 | -0.0244 | -0.0744 | -0.0868 | -0.0881 |
| | (-1.6494) | (-1.0536) | (-1.7623*) | (-1.6456) | (-1.4977) |
| Fixed year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 | 0.1773 | 0.1371 | 0.2070 | 0.1681 | 0.1866 |
| F-statistic | 1.4681 | 1.0820 | 1.7787** | 1.3764 | 1.5629* |
| *, **, and *** significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. |
Table 9 examines the impact of workplace safety incidents on fairness scores. For firms with an A rating, the coefficient for AR1 = -0.0398 (p < 10%) is significantly negative, indicating that firms with higher fairness ratings are at greater risk of experiencing a substantial decline in their scores following a workplace safety incident. To mitigate this risk, such firms should proactively establish crisis management strategies, including transparent disclosure of response plans, to maintain stakeholder trust.
Table 9
The impact of workplace accidents or occupational diseases on Fair scores.
| variable | AR 0 | AR 1 | CAR(-1, 1) | CAR(-1, 2) | CAR(-1, 3) |
| C | -4.3243 | -4.1129 | -7.1311 | -5.8052 | -9.9056 |
| | (-1.8355*) | (-1.7873*) | (-1.6797*) | (-1.1102) | (-1.6930*) |
| LOG_TA(Million) | 0.2587 | 0.1428 | 0.4636 | 0.6080 | 0.7939 |
| | (1.6597*) | (0.9381) | (1.6504) | (1.7575*) | (2.0510**) |
| PB | -0.0712 | -0.1983 | -0.6415 | -0.9214 | -1.1360 |
| | (-0.3465) | (-0.9880) | (-1.7326*) | (-2.0203**) | (-2.2263**) |
| Debt | 0.0158 | 0.0219 | 0.0288 | 0.0133 | 0.0377 |
| | (0.7482) | (1.0630) | (0.7561) | (0.2840) | (0.7178) |
| Current | 0.0028 | 0.0036 | 0.0035 | 0.0039 | 0.0027 |
| | (1.0014) | (1.3154) | (0.6977) | (0.6295) | (0.3811) |
| TA Turnover | 0.5231 | 0.4547 | 0.6720 | 0.3606 | 0.5408 |
| | (0.8295) | (0.7381) | (0.5913) | (0.2576) | (0.3452) |
| ROA | -0.0649 | -0.0210 | -0.0906 | -0.0919 | -0.0643 |
| | (-1.5664) | (-0.5189) | (-1.2136) | (-1.0001) | (-0.6255) |
| Cash Flow | -0.1897 | -0.2404 | 0.0445 | -0.2348 | -0.0955 |
| | (-0.2801) | (-0.3634) | (0.0365) | (-0.1562) | (-0.0567) |
| R&D(Million) | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| | (-0.5193) | (0.2121) | (-0.2193) | (-0.2600) | (-0.6176) |
| E score | -0.0151 | -0.0323 | -0.0441 | -0.0339 | -0.0665 |
| | (-0.4987) | (-1.0934) | (-0.8094) | (-0.5041) | (-0.8851) |
| S score | 0.0357 | 0.0187 | 0.0681 | 0.0627 | 0.0904 |
| | (1.0701) | (0.5735) | (1.1312) | (0.8457) | (1.0908) |
| G score | 0.0184 | 0.0430 | 0.0733 | 0.1077 | 0.1234 |
| | (0.5279) | (1.2638) | (1.1673) | (1.3934) | (1.4268) |
| Health score | -0.0061 | -0.0010 | -0.0121 | -0.0207 | -0.0328 |
| | (-0.3773) | (-0.0609) | (-0.4127) | (-0.5743) | (-0.8143) |
| Fair score_Dummy A | -0.0139 | -0.0398 | -0.0505 | -0.0620 | -0.0796 |
| | (-0.5812) | (-1.7093*) | (-1.1748) | (-1.1713) | (-1.3452) |
| Fair score_Dummy B | 0.0059 | -0.0102 | 0.0046 | -0.0130 | -0.0158 |
| | (0.2623) | (-0.4652) | (0.1132) | (-0.2613) | (-0.2842) |
| Fair score_Dummy C | -0.0305 | 0.0133 | -0.0364 | -0.0390 | -0.0287 |
| | (-1.0298) | (0.4589) | (-0.6834) | (-0.5944) | (-0.3906) |
| Fixed year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 | 0.1417 | 0.1174 | 0.1713 | 0.1549 | 0.1679 |
| F-statistic | 1.1246 | 0.9058 | 1.4078 | 1.2487 | 1.3750 |
| *, **, and *** significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. |
In this paper, we employ the difference-in-differences methodology to control for industry-specific factors that may contribute to excess abnormal returns on the event announcement date. This approach allows us to isolate and exclude the influence of industry effects, thereby providing a more accurate assessment of the impact of workplace accidents on stock performance. This approach compares the stock performance of companies that have experienced workplace accidents (the experimental group) with that of similar companies within the same industry that have not (the control group).
The analysis employs dummy variables to assess the period from one day before to five days after the announcement of the accident. Specifically, Dummy Variable 1 captures this time frame (coded as 1 for the experimental group and 0 otherwise), while Dummy Variable 2 identifies the event announcement date (coded as 1 on the announcement day and 0 otherwise). The interaction term between these dummy variables is used to estimate the effect of interest.
The results of the difference-in-differences analysis reveal a statistically significant negative correlation between the announcement of workplace accidents and stock returns. The coefficient of -0.5613 indicates a notable decline in stock prices on the day the accident was announced (Table 10).
These findings underscore the substantial financial impact of workplace safety. The observed negative market reactions suggest that investors perceive workplace accidents as indicative of increased risk, leading to a decrease in stock value. This highlights the critical importance for companies to prioritize workplace safety, both to uphold ethical standards and to safeguard their financial performance.
Table 10
The research results of the difference-in-differences study.
| variable | Coefficient | t-Statistic | observations |
| C | 0.1200 | (1.3852) | 254 |
| Dummy 1 | -0.2703 | (-2.2058**) | 254 |
| Dummy 2 | 0.1093 | (0.4766) | 254 |
| Dummy1_ Dummy 2 | -0.5613 | (-1.7309*) | 254 |
| F-statistic | 4.5520*** | | |
| *, **, and *** significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. |