Evolutionary theory predicts that the expected duration of the reproductive life span should influence age at first reproduction: individuals who expect to die early should begin to reproduce earlier (Charnov 1991; Stearns 1992). There is some empirical evidence to support this prediction in humans, although much of this evidence is correlational. Low et al. (2008) showed that, across countries, female life expectancy is associated with age at first birth, with earlier onset of reproduction where mortality rates are high (see also Walker et al. 2006). Similarly, Lycett & Dunbar (2000) found that expected future reproductive lifespan was a significant factor influencing single women’s decisions to opt for an abortion. Guegan et al. (2001) reported that disease burden (interpreted as an index of prevailing mortality risk) predicts total fertility rates across human societies, while Quinlan (2007) found that, in societies where death rates are high (due to disease, famine or warfare), weaning is earlier and maternal investment in offspring is reduced compared to societies where conditions are more favourable. In sum, poor quality environments where the future is unpredictable favour a ‘fast’ lifehistory strategy that involves a suite of behaviours that involve an early switch from growth to reproduction, high fertility and low parental investment (Bielby et al. 2007; Nettle 2010).
Essentially similar effects have been noted at a within-society level. In a study of US urban environments, reproduction was shifted earlier in neighbourhoods which had higher mortality and morbidity rates (Geronimus 1996; Geronimus et al. 1999; Wilson & Daly 1997). Similarly, Nettle & Cockerill (2010; see also Nettle 2011) reported that, in the UK, women’s age at first reproduction was, on average, 8 years earlier in a low socio-economic neighbourhood than in a high SES one. Indices of maternal investment (such as birthweight and the duration of breastfeeding) are well known to vary with socioeconomic status (Dubois & Girard 2006; Kohlhuber et al. 2008; Mortensen et al. 2008). Similarly, many studies have noted that women begin reproducing earlier, reproduce more frequently, and invest less in each offspring in neighbourhoods where social and economic deprivation resulted in a shortened expectation of life (Nettle 2010, 2011; Brooks-Gunn et al. 1993; McCulloch 2001; Smith & Elander 2006).
The lifehistory consequences of reproducing may be exacerbated in a knowledge-based economy such as that prevailing in most of the industrialised world. The need to ensure that offspring are competitive in terms of education, wealth and/or social/economic opportunities favours a reduction in fertility and a corresponding investment in offspring quality (Becker & Lewis 1973; Rogers 1990; Mace 1998). In such contexts, future earning potential may be important and may favour the postponement of reproduction in order to further investment in social or career prospects that offer enhanced mate choice opportunities or the acquisition of resources that can be invested in offspring. In such contexts, women who can afford to do so (and hence, especially, women from higher socioeconomic [SES] classes) should be more willing to delay the onset of childbearing in order to further their educational and career opportunities.
Although many of these contingent effects are well known, they have typically been examined piecemeal, in a descriptive rather than an explanatory framework and almost never in a lifehistory context (Nettle 2010, 2011). Here, we use a simulation model to investigate the lifetime fertility consequences of postponing reproduction in the interests of furthering career opportunities when these are likely to have significant socioeconomic consequences. We assume that, in a socio-economic environment where the costs of producing children who will be able to function effectively in the adult economy are high (due to the high costs of education and/or of placing children in a socio-economically advantageous position), parents will reduce family size to that in which they can realistically afford to invest (Mace 1998). Nettle (2008) suggested that women from lower socioeconomic classes might be content to match the reproductive outputs of higher SES women rather than try to out-compete them, in part because paternal investment (of which father absence is a common, though not necessarily the only, component) exhibits a marked socio-economic class gradient. This may add to the economic costs of rearing for mothers in lower SES classes, since the burden of rearing will fall disproportionately on their shoulders and may encourage them to favour a satisficing rather than a maximizing reproductive strategy.
If so, then the higher costs of reproduction experienced by individuals in the lower socio-economic classes is likely to mean that, in order to achieve their reproductive goal, women in these classes will have to begin reproduction earlier, and/or continue reproducing later, in order to arrive at the same final family size as women in the higher social classes. We thus hypothesise that the observed differences in age at first reproduction between socioeconomic classes may become part of a strategy designed to achieve the same desired family size under different constraints.
This could only be the case, however, if it is true that early reproduction does not increase the risks of unsuccessful reproductive events, when socioeconomic status is controlled for. Data for first pregnancies from the British Cohort Study confirm that maternal age currently has no predictive power for a successful outcome for first pregnancy when social class is a covariate (N = 9475: β=-0.001, Wald = 0.010, df = 1, p = 0.920). This is consistent with much recent work showing that the negative effects of young maternal age have previously been exaggerated by a failure to consider the confounding effects of parity and social class (Arif et al. 1998; Malik et al. 1997; Reichman & Pagnini 1997).
In order to test the prediction that the higher mortality and unsuccessful pregnancy rates experienced by women in the lower social classes would result in lower lifetime reproductive success compared to women in the higher social classes if they delayed age at first reproduction, we developed a simulation model using class-specific mortality and fertility data to calculate the probability of women surviving and reproducing in each year between the ages of 15 and 45 years. Our aim is to ask whether social class differences in age at first reproduction could be due mainly to class differences in fertility and mortality, and individual women’s attempts to optimise completed family size (i.e. lifetime reproductive output) under different constraints. We test the model against the observed class differentials in age at first reproduction.